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Abstract: Purists think that changes in our practical interests can’t affect our knowledge unless those 
changes are truth-relevant with respect to the propositions in question. Impurists disagree. They think 
changes in our practical interests can affect our knowledge even if those changes aren’t truth-relevant 
with respect to the propositions in question. I argue that impurists are right, but for the wrong reasons, 
since impurists haven’t appreciated the best argument for their own view. As I show, there is an 
argument for impurism sitting in plain sight that is considerably more plausible than any extant 
argument for impurism.   
How, if at all, do our practical interests affect our knowledge? According to the thesis 
that I will call ‘purism,’ changes in our practical interests can’t affect what we know 
unless those changes are truth-relevant with respect to the propositions in question. 
According to the negation of this thesis, which I will call ‘impurism,’ changes in our 
practical interests can affect what we know even if those changes aren’t truth-relevant 
with respect to the propositions in question. If impurism is true, then changes in our 
practical interests might affect our knowledge without affecting our evidence for the 
relevant proposition, the reliability of the cognitive faculties responsible for our belief 
in that proposition, the safety of our belief in that proposition, and so on, for any other 
truth-relevant property that we might care about.1  
The literature contains two kinds of arguments for impurism: what I will call 
‘principle-based arguments’ and ‘intuition-based arguments’ (‘PBAs’ and ‘IBAs’ for 
short).2 The former attempt to motivate impurism by motivating some principle like 
KA, below, and then deducing impurism from this principle.  
(KA) S knows that p only if she can rationally act as if p.  
Prominent PBAs include Fantl and McGrath’s (2002, 2009), Ganson’s (2008), 
Weatherson’s (2012), Schroeder’s (2012), Ross and Schroeder’s (2014), and on one 
reading Hawthorne and Stanley’s (2008). In contrast to PBAs, IBAs offer impurism as 
the best explanation of our intuitive reactions to pairs of cases that differ with respect 
to the subject’s practical interests, but do not differ with respect to the strength of the 
                                                        
* Penultimate draft. Please cite final draft in Synthese.  
1 By ‘truth-irrelevant factors,’ I mean exactly what DeRose means (2009: 25): factors that don’t affect the 
probability that the belief in question is true, either from the point of view of the person who holds that 
belief or from any more objective point of view.  
2 Cf. Roeber 2018a, p. 1.  
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subject’s epistemic position.3 Stanley’s (2005) IBA is the central example. His argument 
involves a person named ‘Hannah’ who seems to say something true by uttering the 
sentence ‘I know that the bank will be open’ in the case that Stanley calls ‘Low Stakes,’ 
and then seems to say something true by uttering the sentence ‘I don’t know that the 
bank will be open’ in the case he calls ‘High Stakes.’4 Since Hannah’s practical interests 
change between Low Stakes and High Stakes while the strength of her epistemic 
position with respect to the proposition that the bank will be open does not, Stanley 
offers impurism as part of the best explanation of our intuition that Hannah says 
something true in both Low Stakes and High Stakes.  
Purists have raised important objections to both kinds of arguments for impurism. 
Stanley’s IBA faces two challenges. First, recent results in experimental philosophy 
suggest that it’s not intuitive (in the relevant sense) that Hannah says something true in 
High Stakes.5 But if this isn’t intuitive, then there’s nothing here for impurism to 
explain. Second, even if it is intuitive that Hannah says something true in High Stakes, 
this intuition is arguably best explained in purist-friendly terms. The contextualist 
explanations forwarded by DeRose (1992, 2009), Cohen (1999, 2005), and others, the 
warranted assertability maneuvers advanced by Rysiew (2001), Brown (2006), Reed 
(2013), Lutz (2014), Locke (2017), and others, and the explanations in terms of missing 
belief developed by Bach (2005) and Nagel (2008, 2010) all provide purist-friendly 
explanations of our intuition that Hannah says something true in High Stakes. And as 
I point out elsewhere (Roeber 2018a: 18-19), by changing just what Hannah says in 
High Stakes, we can elicit the intuition that she does know that the bank will be open in 
High Stakes, which suggests that our intuitions about High Stakes track what Hannah 
tells us about her knowledge rather than the relevant details of her practical interests. 
Since analogous challenges would face any other IBA, the case against purism arguably 
rests on the best PBAs in the literature. But PBAs depend on principles like KA, and 
these principles seem susceptible to the counterexamples forwarded by Brown (2008), 
Reed (2010), Cohen (2012), Anderson (2015), myself (2018a), and many others. With 
all of the relevant considerations in view, there seems no serious threat to purism—or 
so many purists think.  
                                                        
3 As I’m using the word ‘intuitive,’ our intuitive reactions to cases report how these cases initially strike us. 
They needn’t report our settled opinions about these cases, and may even conflict with our settled opinions. 
The skeptical paradox helps illustrate the distinction. In the relevant sense of ‘intuitive,’ I find each of the 
following simultaneously intuitive: (a) that I know that I have hands, (b) that I don’t know that I’m not a 
disembodied brain in a vat, and (c) that if I know that I have hands, then I do know that I’m not a disembodied 
brain in a vat. My settled opinion is that, since (a) and (c) are true, (b) must be false. But while my settled 
opinion is that (b) is false, I still find (b) intuitive, in the relevant sense. Throughout this paper, whenever I 
use the words ‘intuition,’ ‘intuitive,’ etc., I will be using them in this sense.   
4 These cases come originally from DeRose 1992.  
5 See, for example, Buckwalter 2010, May, Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull, and Zimmerman 2010, Feltz and 
Zarpentine 2010, Schaffer and Knobe 2012, Phelan 2014, Buckwalter and Schaffer 2015, Turri 2017, and 
especially Rose et al 2017.  
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This, in fact, is exactly what I used to think. But as I will now argue, impurists 
haven’t given the best argument for their own view, and purists haven’t produced any 
adequate response to this argument. In certain respects, this argument has been sitting 
in plain sight. It simply develops an idea suggested by Fantl and McGrath’s passing 
comment that “we care more about getting the best results than getting the best 
expected results” (2009: 81), which they use to block an objection to their argument 
for the principle they call “Safe Reasons,” which they employ in their argument for the 
principle they call “KJ,” which is the main premise in their argument against purism. 
But as I hope will become clear, the idea suggested by Fantl and McGrath’s passing 
comment supports a much more direct and conservative argument for impurism than 
any extant argument for impurism, and this new argument for impurism isn’t 
susceptible to the apparent counterexamples that plague Safe Reasons and the rest of 
the principles in the pragmatic encroachment literature. In fact, as I hope to show, this 
argument gives impurists a way to motivate their view even if the best PBAs and IBAs 
in the literature all fail.  
1. Preliminaries 
Purism is the thesis that truth-irrelevant changes in our practical interests can’t affect 
our knowledge. Thus, purism is true iff no pair of possible cases satisfies the following 
description: S knows that p in Case A but not Case B, even though Case B is identical 
to Case A except for some truth-irrelevant difference in S’s practical interests. Call pairs 
of possible cases that do satisfy this description ‘encroachment cases.’6 Since impurism 
is the negation of purism, impurism is true iff there is at least one pair of encroachment 
cases. Thus, impurism is logically equivalent to an existential claim. Now, of course, 
skepticism trivially entails that encroachment cases aren’t possible, so it trivially entails 
that purism is true. And skepticism also trivially entails that principles like KA are true, 
since it entails that there is no possible scenario where one of these principles has a 
true antecedent. Since the interesting question is whether purism is true even if skepticism 
is false, and since the literature contains virtually no debate between impurists and 
skeptical purists, I will assume throughout that skepticism is false. Indeed, whenever I 
say ‘purists,’ I will mean non-skeptical purists. With this in mind, consider the following 
cases (adapted from Reed 2010), and assume that they are identical except for the 
stipulated difference in your practical interests. 
Case A: You are participating in a psychological study where the researcher 
asks you questions about ornithology—a subject with which you are very well 
acquainted. For every correct answer you give, the researcher will reward you 
                                                        
6 Encroachment cases are a species of what I call ‘encroachment scenarios’ in Roeber 2018b. Specifically, 
encroachment cases are just encroachment scenarios where practical interests are the truth-irrelevant factors in 
question.    
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with a jellybean; for every incorrect answer, and every question left unanswered, 
you will get nothing. The first question is whether hawks are raptors. You know 
that the answer is ‘yes.’  
Case B: You are participating in a study exactly like the one in Case A, except 
in this study you know that you will be punished by an extremely painful electric 
shock each time you give an incorrect answer. Again, the first question is 
whether hawks are raptors. Though you remain convinced that the answerer is 
‘yes,’ and while your epistemic position with respect to the proposition that 
hawks are raptors is just as strong in this case as it was in Case A, you shouldn’t 
answer the question, since you know that the shock would be unbearable, and 
you know that, even if you are right, you will only get a jellybean.7  
These cases don’t support impurism by evoking anything analogous to the intuition 
that Hannah says something true by uttering the sentence ‘I do not know that that 
bank will be open’ in High Stakes, the intuition that Hannah does not know that the 
bank will be open in High Stakes, or any other knowledge denying intuition—as would 
be required if impurists wanted to use Case A and Case B in an IBA. Indeed, as Reed 
points out (p. 229), it’s actually intuitive that you do know that hawks are raptors in 
Case B, and for this reason it’s tempting to think that Case B is a counterexample to 
principles like KA. By adding further details to Case B, however, impurists can make 
it increasingly plausible that our intuitions about Case B are actually mistaken, and that, 
contrary to the way Case B initially strikes us, you do not know that hawks are raptors 
in Case B. Since they can add these details while honoring our assumption that Case B 
is identical to Case A except for the stipulated differences in your practical interests, 
they can make it increasingly plausible that Case A and Case B give us a pair of 
encroachment cases. And since impurism is true if there is a single pair of 
encroachment cases, they can make it increasingly plausible that impurism is true.  
In Case A and Case B, you understand the setup of the experiment. In both cases, 
you know what your options are, you know what consequences might follow from 
these options, and you know how to rank these consequences. Specifically, in both 
cases, you know that you have exactly three options: answering ‘yes,’ answering ‘no,’ 
and refraining from answering. In Case A, you know that, if hawks are raptors, then 
you will get a jellybean if you answer ‘yes,’ and you will get nothing if you answer ‘no’ 
or refrain from answering. In Case B, you know that, if hawks are raptors, then you 
will get a jellybean if you answer ‘yes,’ you will get a severe electric shock if you answer 
‘no,’ and you will get nothing if you refrain from answering. So, in both cases, you know 
that, if hawks are raptors, then you will get a jellybean if you answer ‘yes,’ and you will 
                                                        
7 Throughout, when I talk about answering the question whether hawks are raptors, I won’t mean forming 
or holding any belief about the answer to this question. Instead, I will mean performing some action (saying 
‘yes,’ pressing a button marked ‘yes,’ or something like that).   
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get either nothing or an electric shock if you do not answer ‘yes.’ Finally, in both cases, 
you know that it would be better to get a jellybean than to get either nothing or an 
electric shock, and you know that these are the only relevant consequences of your 
options. So, in both Case A and Case B, you know that, if hawks are raptors, then 
answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your options.  
This is all part of my intended reading of Case A and Case B. But we should be 
careful here. As Reed points out (ibid: 230), we might say that an option is best in order 
to convey that it has the highest expected utility of someone’s options. This is important 
because, from the fact that hawks are raptors, it doesn’t follow that answering ‘yes’ has 
the highest expected utility of anybody’s options, including yours. The expected utilities 
of your options depend (among other things) on the relevant probability that hawks 
are raptors, not the fact that hawks are raptors.8 If this probability is too low (if, for 
example, you are insufficiently confident that hawks are raptors, or you have 
insufficient evidence that hawks are raptors), then answering ‘yes’ will not have the 
highest expected utility of your options even though hawks are raptors. Since you can’t 
know what isn’t true, it can’t be part of the correct understanding of Case A and Case 
B that you know that, if hawks are raptors, then answering ‘yes’ has the highest 
expected utility of your options.9  
What is the correct understanding of Case A and Case B, then? Here we must 
distinguish between the expected utility of an action and its actual utility, where the 
actual utility of φ-ing will be the value of the consequences that will actually result from 
φ-ing. Suppose you toss a coin and bet me $1 that it landed tails. If I accept the bet and 
the coin landed tails, I lose $1 and neither gain nor lose anything else. If I accept the 
bet and the coin landed heads, I gain $1 and neither gain nor lose anything else. Finally, 
if I decline the bet, I neither gain nor lose anything at all. Now suppose the coin landed 
heads, but neither of us knows this yet. In this case, the expected utility of accepting 
the bet equals the probability of heads times $1, plus the probability of tails times –$1, 
which equals $0, assuming that heads and tails are equally probable. In contrast, 
because the coin did land heads, the actual utility of accepting the bet is exactly $1. In 
Case B, since hawks are raptors, the actual utility of answering ‘yes’ equals the value of 
receiving the jellybean, the actual utility of answering ‘no’ equals the value of receiving 
the electric shock, and the actual utility of refraining from answering equals the value 
of maintaining status quo. The conditional according to which, if hawks are raptors, then 
answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your options is meant to have the 
                                                        
8 The relevant probability will presumably be either your subjective probability (credence) that hawks are 
raptors or some epistemic probability that they are. It will not be the objective probability that hawks are 
raptors.   
9 I’m not here denying the material conditional if you know that hawks are raptors, then answering ‘yes’ has the highest 
expected utility of your options (cf. Weatherson 2012). Instead, at this point, I’m merely denying the strict 
conditional if hawks are raptors, then answering ‘yes’ has the highest expected utility of your options and pointing out that, 
because this conditional is false, you can’t know that it’s true.   
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same truth-conditions as the following material conditional: if hawks are raptors, then 
answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual utility of your options. It’s part of my 
intended reading of Case A and Case B that you know that this conditional is true.  
So far so good. Now let’s imagine impurists adding a detail to both Case A and Case 
B. Let’s imagine that, in the versions of these cases that impurists want us to consider, 
the following claim is true:  
(C) After reading the first question and considering the setup of the 
experiment, you reason as follows: “If hawks are raptors, then 
answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of my options. Hawks 
are raptors. So, answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of my 
options.” On the basis of this reasoning, you form the belief that 
answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your options. 
Impurists can ask us to consider whatever cases they want us to consider. So, however 
we are inclined to interpret Reed’s original jellybean case, impurists can stipulate that 
(C) is true in Case A and Case B. With this in mind, consider (1), below, and read it as 
a material conditional.  
(1) If you know that hawks are raptors in Case B, then you know that 
answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your options in Case 
B.  
Should purists accept (1)? Some purists will accept it because it follows from some 
closure principle that they accept, but the deeper reason every purist should accept (1) 
is that, even if every extant closure principle is has counterexamples (as I’m inclined to 
think), purists will have no principled reason for resisting the bald stipulation that (1) 
is true. Why? Consider the following principle.   
Deduction Guarantees Ignorance (DGI): For every value of ‘S,’ every value 
of ‘p,’ and every value of ‘q,’ necessarily, if S deduces q from her belief that p 
and her belief that (p É q), then S does not know that q.  
DGI seems absurd on its face, but in case it isn’t already obvious why every purist 
should reject DGI, note that it entails KGI, below.  
Knowledge Guarantees Ignorance (KGI): For every value of ‘S,’ every value 
of ‘p,’ and every value of ‘q,’ necessarily, if S knows both that p and that (p É q), 
and S competently deduces q from her belief that p and her belief that (p É q), 
then S does not know that q.  
Some purists might think that, if you deduce q from your belief that p and your belief 
that (p É q), then your epistemic position with respect to q will be weaker than both 
 
 
7 
your epistemic position with respect to p and your epistemic position with respect to 
(p É q). Even so, no purist will think that, if you competently deduce q from your belief 
that p and your belief that (p É q), then your epistemic position with respect to q must 
be so much weaker than your epistemic position with respect to both p and (p É q) that 
your belief that q must fall short of knowledge even if you know both that p and that (p É 
q). Competent deduction from knowledge may not guarantee more knowledge, but it 
certainly doesn’t guarantee new ignorance. So purists should reject both KGI and DGI. 
They should conclude that it’s possible to know each of p, (p É q), and q after 
competently deducing q from p and (p É q)). 
Once purists accept this conclusion, however, they will have no principled means 
of resisting the bald stipulation that (1) is true. Since the truth of the consequent of a 
material conditional suffices for the truth of the conditional itself, q entails (p É q), for 
any values of ‘p’ and ‘q.’ Thus, where ‘Kr’ names the proposition that you know that 
hawks are raptors in Case B, and ‘Kb’ names the proposition that you know that 
answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your options in Case B, Kb entails 
(Kr É Kb). And since (Kr É Kb) is identical to (1), Kb entails (1). So take any strength of 
epistemic position that a given purist thinks is necessary for knowledge. Then there 
seems no reason why impurists couldn’t fill in the details of Case A and Case B so that 
your epistemic position with respect to the proposition that answering ‘yes’ will have 
the best consequences of your options is at least that strong. But this means that, for 
any given purist, there should be some way to fill in the details of Case A and Case B 
so that, by the lights of that purist, Kb is true. Thus, since Kb entails (1), there seems no 
reason why impurists couldn’t fill in the details of Case A and Case B so that, by the 
lights of any given purist, (1) is true. This is why, if impurists just stipulate that (1) is 
true, purists will have no principled reason for rejecting the stipulation.10  
2. Expected Utility versus Known Actual Utility  
Let’s take it for granted, then, that (1) is true in the versions of Case A and Case B that 
impurists are asking us to consider. Given this assumption, what follows? Case A 
stipulates that you know that hawks are raptors. By hypothesis, Case B differs from 
Case A only insofar as the stipulated difference in your practical interests requires that 
they differ. Thus, either Case A and Case B give us a pair of encroachment cases, or 
you know that hawks are raptors in Case B. If you know that hawks are raptors in Case 
B, however, then (1) entails that you know that answering ‘yes’ will have the best 
consequences of your options in Case B. So, if purism is true, you know that answering 
                                                        
10 Again, I’m assuming that skepticism is false. (Skepticism entails that DGI and KGI are both true, since it 
entails that the consequent of DGI is true in every possible world while the antecedent of KGI is false in 
every possible world.)  
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‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your options in Case B. This follows from our 
assumption that (1) is true. With this in mind, consider (2), below, and read it as a 
material conditional like (1).   
(2) If you know that answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of 
your options in Case B, then you may answer ‘yes’ in Case B.11  
I find (2) plausible, at least on the intended reading of Case A and Case B. And as 
we’ll see below, (1) and (2) give impurists a straightforward argument against purism. 
Before impurists can rely on (2) in an argument against purism, however, they must 
head off an objection suggested by Brown (2012), Reed (2010, 2013), and other purists. 
According to this objection, impurism is false unless fallibilism is true, but fallibilist 
knowledge doesn’t require certainty. Thus, just as you might know that hawks are 
raptors even though you can’t be certain that hawks are raptors, you might know that 
answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your options even though you can’t 
be certain that answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your options. Because 
the potential costs of a mistake in Case B are so high, however, answering ‘yes’ won’t 
maximize expected utility unless you can be certain that answering ‘yes’ will have the 
best consequences of your options. Since rationality requires that you maximize 
expected utility, you are rationally required to refrain from answering, even though you 
know that answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your options. Thus, you 
shouldn’t answer the question, even though you know that answering ‘yes’ will have 
the best consequences of your options. Given the truth of fallibilism, it’s therefore clear 
how you might know that answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your 
options in Case B, even though you shouldn’t answer ‘yes’ in Case B. Since, intuitively, 
you know that hawks are raptors in Case B, and since, together with (1), your knowing 
that hawks are raptors in Case B entails your knowing that answering ‘yes’ will have the 
best consequences of your options in Case B, we have excellent reason to reject (2).  
This is essentially Reed’s take on Case B (2010: 229). In reply, impurists should 
emphasize that it’s still unclear why you shouldn’t answer ‘yes’ in Case B, if you know 
that answering ‘yes’ will have the best consequences of your options. As I noted above, 
when I say that φ-ing will have the best consequences of a person’s options, I mean 
that φ-ing will have the highest actual utility of her options. Thus, (2) tells us that you 
may answer ‘yes’ in Case B if you know that answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual 
utility of your options. So, to resist (2), purists must explain why you shouldn’t answer 
‘yes’ in Case B even though you know that answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual 
utility of your options. And to explain this, purists cannot merely say that answering 
‘yes’ doesn’t have the highest expected utility of your options. First, answering ‘yes’ does 
have the highest expected utility of your options if the probability that hawks are 
                                                        
11 Here and throughout, I am using ‘you may’ as shorthand for ‘it is false that you should not.’  
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raptors conditional on your relevant evidence is 1, so purists must argue that, even 
though you know that hawks are raptors, the probability that hawks are raptors 
conditional on your relevant evidence is lower than 1. This won’t be easy, but I won’t 
press the point, since I think purists can successfully defend a version of fallibilism on 
which, even though you know that hawks are raptors, the probability that hawks are 
raptors conditional on your relevant evidence is lower than 1 (see Brown 2012: 57-9, 
for example). Indeed, from here forward, I will assume that exactly this sort of 
fallibilism is correct, and I will assume that the probability of a proposition conditional 
on your relevant evidence might be lower than 1 even if you know that the proposition 
is true. A point I will press, however, is that, even if this version of fallibilism is correct 
and answering ‘yes’ does not have the highest expected utility of your options, it’s still 
hard to see why you should pick the option with the highest expected utility, if you 
know that answering ‘yes’ will have higher actual utility. 
Why should a person care about, or be mindful of, or act in accordance with the 
expected utilities of her options? Why should expected utilities guide a person’s actions, 
or constrain how she should act? According to one standard answer, the expected 
utilities of a person’s options are her best guide to maximizing actual utility. This 
answer is clearly often right. It’s easy to see why the expected utilities of a person’s 
options would be her best guide to maximizing actual utility in a case where she doesn’t 
know which of her options will have the highest actual utility. It’s also arguable that 
the expected utilities of a person’s options would be her best guide to maximizing 
actual utility in a case where she does know which of her options will have the highest 
actual utility and this option is also her option with the highest expected utility. But why 
would the expected utilities of a person’s options be her best guide to maximizing 
actual utility in a case where she knows which of her options will have the highest 
actual utility and this option does not have the highest expected utility? More to the point, 
if purism is true, why would the expected utilities of your options be your best guide 
to maximizing actual utility in Case B? If purism is true, refraining from answering will 
have the highest expected utility in Case B, even though, in Case B, you know that you 
will maximize actual utility by answering ‘yes.’ But why should we think that, even 
though your option with the highest expected utility in Case B will not have the highest 
actual utility in Case B, and even though you know which of your options will have the 
highest actual utility in Case B (namely, answering ‘yes’), the expected utilities of your 
options are still your best guide to maximizing actual utility—not just in general or on 
average, but in Case B?  
Here purists might invoke what we might call the ‘traditional view’ of expected 
utilities, tracing back to Ramsey (1926). On this view, we never have direct access to 
the world, so, when we decide what to do, we’re always in effect “guessing” what the 
world is like—as Ramsey puts it (p. 183). We do have direct access to our relevant values 
and credences, however. Or, at least, we have much better access to our relevant values 
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and credences than we have to the external world. Since expected utilities weight our 
values by our credences, the expected utilities of our options are thus always our best 
guides to maximizing actual utility, and this means they’re your best guide to 
maximizing actual utility in Case B. 
The traditional view has its virtues, but it’s hard to see how purists can invoke it to 
explain why the expected utilities of your options would be your best guide to 
maximizing actual utility in Case B. After all, if you know that hawks are raptors, if you 
know that you will get a jellybean if you answer the first question ‘yes,’ and so on—as 
purists must say—then you’re not just guessing what the world is like, and this leaves it 
unclear how purists can agree with the traditional view that, even in Case B, where you 
know all of the relevant facts about the world, you have better access to your relevant 
values and credences than you have to the world.12  
A much better response—one that purists are nearly certain to give—goes as 
follows: your evidence for and against the proposition that answering ‘yes’ will have the 
highest actual utility of your options is what matters for your choice between answering 
the question and leaving it unanswered, not whether your belief in this proposition 
counts as an item of knowledge. In Case B, however, your evidence for and against the 
proposition that answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual utility of your options does 
not eliminate every possibility of error. With respect to the question whether you can 
answer ‘yes’ in Case B, there is therefore no relevant difference between your knowing 
that answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual utility of your options and your having 
equally strong but misleading evidence that answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual 
utility of your options. So now recall that the researcher has a long list of questions that 
she intends to ask you. If you have enough evidence to answer the first question ‘yes,’ 
there is no reason why you cannot have enough evidence to answer every question that 
she asks you—assuming that they are all roughly as hard for you as the question 
whether hawks are raptors. But even given this assumption, there is a reason why you 
shouldn’t answer every question she asks you: namely, you should see in advance that 
you would eventually make a mistake and receive an unbearable electric shock. So, even 
though you know that answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual utility of your 
options, you shouldn’t answer ‘yes.’  
According to this line of thought, the reason you shouldn’t answer the first question 
‘yes,’ even though you know that answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual utility of 
your options, is that it should be clear to you in advance that relevantly analogous 
behavior with respect to the rest of the questions would not maximize actual utility. In 
response, impurists might argue that relevantly analogous behavior would consist in 
                                                        
12 While I know that hawks are raptors (at least as I sit here typing at my computer), I don’t know what 
credence I have in this proposition. I know it’s pretty high, and I know it’s also lower than (say) my credence 
that 1 = 1, but this is about all I know. There’s no value of ‘x’ for which I can be anywhere near certain that 
my credence in this proposition is exactly x.    
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answering only questions for which you know the answer (cf. Williamson 2014). A 
more conservative reply, however, consists in simply denying that the foreseeable 
consequences of answering every question adequately explain why you shouldn’t 
answer the first question. Compare Case B to Case C, below. 
Case C: You are participating in a study exactly like the one in Case B, except 
in this study you know that there is an important difference between the first 
question and all of the rest of the questions on the test. Specifically, you know 
that the researcher will disconnect the machine after the first question, so that 
there’s no risk of an electric shock on any question except the first question.  
Can you answer the first question in this case? Again, you definitely shouldn’t. But the 
foreseeable consequences of answering the rest of the questions do not explain why, 
since you know that you will just accumulate a bunch of jellybeans by answering the 
rest of the questions. Yet the reason you shouldn’t answer the first question in Case C 
is presumably identical (whatever it is) to the reason you shouldn’t answer the first 
question in Case B. So it’s still unclear why you shouldn’t answer the first question in 
Case B, if you know that answering this question ‘yes’ will have the highest actual utility 
of your options.  
Here purists might say that you shouldn’t answer the first question in Case B and 
Case C because, in the long run, not just on the test but over the course of your whole 
life, you will gain more actual utility by following the rule maximize expected utility than 
by following the rule if you know which option will have the highest actual utility, pick that option; 
otherwise, maximize expected utility. But this reply faces exactly the same challenge. 
Consider Case D, below.  
Case D: You are participating in a study exactly like the one in Case B, except 
that in this study you know that you are about to die. There is only one question: 
whether hawks are raptors. If you answer correctly, you will get a jellybean and 
then die. If you answer incorrectly, you will get an extremely painful electric 
shock and then die. If you refrain from answering, you will get nothing and 
then die. Your aversion to being tortured by an electric shock the last moment 
of your life is much stronger than your desire to enjoy a single jellybean the last 
moment of your life.  
Once again, you shouldn’t answer the question whether hawks are raptors. But in this 
case it’s false that, over the course of the rest of your life, you will gain more actual 
utility by following the rule maximize expected utility than by following the rule if you know 
which option will have the highest actual utility, pick that option; otherwise, maximize expected utility. 
So, what else can purists say? They might be tempted to say that you shouldn’t answer 
the first question because, if you weren’t going to die, then you would gain more actual 
utility over the rest of your life by following the rule maximize expected utility than by 
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following the rule if you know which option will have the highest actual utility, pick that option; 
otherwise, maximize expected utility. But even if the truth of this counterfactual explains 
why you shouldn’t answer ‘yes’ in Case D (which I think is doubtful), impurists can 
simply swap out Case D for a case in which this counterfactual is false. Simply imagine 
a case where (for whatever reason) you have a guardian angel that would make you 
completely infallible immediately after answering the first question, if you weren’t going 
to die. Even if you knew for certain that, in every possible world where you don’t die 
immediately after answering the first question, your guardian angel makes you 
completely infallible from that moment on, you still shouldn’t answer the first question. 
But now the explanation can’t be that, if you weren’t going to die, then you would gain 
more actual utility over the rest of your life by following the rule maximize expected utility 
than by following the rule if you know which option will have the highest actual utility, pick that 
option; otherwise, maximize expected utility. It seems that the correct explanation (whatever 
it is) must focus on features of just the first question. So, it’s still hard to see why you 
shouldn’t answer the first question if you know that answering ‘yes’ will have the 
highest actual utility of your options.  
Perhaps, at this point, purists will argue that you should do whatever you are 
rationally required to do, and then argue (on the basis of representation theorems, or 
something like that) that you are rationally required to refrain from answering, even 
though you know that answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual utility of your 
options. But this argument won’t convince. After all, if you know that answering ‘yes’ 
will have the highest actual utility of your options, then you can deduce that you would 
simply make yourself worse off, and make literally nothing better off, by doing what 
this argument says you are rationally required to do. Since it is unclear why rationality 
(thus conceived) should have inviolable normative force, we still have a puzzle. And 
since this puzzle arises from rejecting (2), purists cannot reject (2) without incurring a 
significant explanatory burden.13  
With (2), however, impurists have an easy argument for their view. Together, (1) 
and (2) jointly entail the following material conditional.    
(3) If you know that hawks are raptors in Case B, then you may answer ‘yes’ 
in Case B.  
But together with the stipulated details of Case A and Case B, (3) entails impurism. By 
hypothesis, you shouldn’t answer the question in Case B. So, if (3) is true, you don’t 
know that hawks are raptors in Case B. But by hypothesis, you do know that hawks are 
raptors in Case A. Since Case A and Case B are identical except for the consequences 
of an incorrect answer, and since these consequences aren’t truth-relevant with respect 
                                                        
13 Note that, because purists think you know that you will only make things worse by doing what this 
argument says you are rationally required to do, purists cannot respond to this puzzle by saying (along with 
Broome 2007) that the requirements of rationality take wide scope.  
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to your belief that hawks are raptors, it follows that, if (3) is true, then Case A and Case 
B give us a pair of encroachment cases. Since impurism is true if there is a single pair 
of encroachment cases, impurism is true if (3) is true. And since impurists can motivate 
(3) by simply adding details to Case A and Case B and asking us to reflect on the 
normative significance of expected versus known actual utility, impurists can modify a 
case forwarded by purists as a problem for impurism and get a pair of cases that seems 
to entail impurism.  
3. Problems for Purism 
As we noted in the opening paragraphs of this paper, the pragmatic encroachment 
literature contains two kinds of arguments against purism: PBAs and IBAs. As we also 
noted in the opening paragraphs of this paper, purists have produced powerful 
responses to both kinds of arguments. In defense against PBAs, purists have produced 
cases that look like counterexamples to the various principles upon which PBAs rely, 
and, in defense against IBAs, they have produced purist-friendly explanations of the 
intuition that Hannah says something true by uttering the sentence ‘I don’t know that 
the bank will be open’ in High Stakes, the intuition that Mary says something true by 
uttering the sentence ‘Smith doesn’t know that the flight will stop in Chicago’ in 
Cohen’s (1999) airport case, and other relevant knowledge-denying intuitions, plus a 
mountain of data suggesting that the folk don’t have these intuitions in the first place. 
Assume, then, that these purist responses to PBAs and IBAs all succeed. Given this 
assumption, does the argument in §§1-2 still threaten purism?   
I think it does. The argument in §§1-2 doesn’t rely on anything like the prima facie 
intuition that Hannah says something true by uttering the sentence ‘I don’t know that 
the bank will be open’ in High Stakes. Instead of asserting that intuitively you don’t 
know that hawks are raptors in Case B and then offering impurism as the best 
explanation of this intuition, it concedes that intuitively you do know that hawks are 
raptors in Case B and then shows how this intuition leads to trouble. Thus, neither the 
purist-friendly explanations of the relevant knowledge-denying intuitions nor the data 
suggesting that the folk don’t have these intuitions have any straightforward application 
to the argument in §§1-2. Now perhaps the empirical data or one of these explanations 
puts purists in a position where, by making certain moves, they can give an adequate 
response to the argument in §§1-2. But if so, let’s see the moves. If, for example, purists 
can respond to the argument in §§1-2 with a modification of some WAM, let’s see the 
modification of the relevant WAM. How’s it going to go, given that Case B doesn’t 
contain any utterance of any knowledge-ascribing or knowledge-denying sentence?14 
The argument in §§1-2 doesn’t rehash any IBA, so purists can’t respond to it by simply 
rehashing one of their objections to an IBA.  
                                                        
14 Cf. Roeber 2014, §7. 
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Consider the purported counterexamples in the literature, then—Brown’s (2008) 
surgeon case, Anderson’s (2015) syringe case, my (2018a) survey case, etc. Do any of 
these cases threaten the argument in §§1-2? The argument in §§1-2 is clearly valid: (1) 
and (2) jointly entail (3), and, together with the stipulated details of Case A and Case 
B, (3) entails that purism is false. Impurists can just stipulate that (1) is true, so, to resist 
(3), purists must produce arguments against (2). But it’s hard to see how any of the 
purported counterexamples in the literature could threaten (2). After all, (2) says just 
that, in Case B, either you shouldn’t answer ‘yes,’ or you don’t know that answering ‘yes’ 
will have the highest actual utility of your options. Even if Brown’s surgeon case is a 
counterexample to Hawthorne and Stanley’s Knowledge-Reason Principle (2008: 578), 
or Anderson’s syringe case is a counterexample to Fantl and McGrath’s KJ (2009: 66), 
or my survey case is a counterexample to Ross and Schroeder’s Knowledge-Action 
Principle (2014: 262), or some other case is a counterexample to some other principle, 
it doesn’t follow that, in Case B, you shouldn’t answer ‘yes’ even though you know that 
answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual utility of your options. This means that 
there is no direct conflict between (2) and the purported counterexamples in the 
literature.  
Now, of course, (2) follows from KU (below), and some version of one the 
purported counterexamples in the literature might be a counterexample to KU. (Read 
it as a strict conditional.)    
(KU) If S knows that φ-ing will have the highest actual utility of her options 
in c, then she may φ in c. 
But of course, (2) might be true while KU is false. To illustrate, suppose Williamson 
(2014) is correct that you might know that p even though you are rationally required to 
believe that you do not know that p, and suppose we get a counterexample to KU from 
a version of Brown’s surgeon case where (a) you know that performing the surgery 
without double-checking the patient’s records will have the highest actual utility of your 
options, but (b) your evidence is “radically misleading” about your epistemic position 
and (c) you are consequently rationally required to believe that you do not know that 
performing the surgery without double-checking the patient’s records will have the 
highest actual utility of your options (ibid: p. 973). Even if this case is a counterexample 
to KU, it doesn’t follow that (2) is false, since (2) concerns just the version of Case B that 
we have been considering, and impurists can stipulate that, in this version of Case B, your 
evidence isn’t radically misleading. To cast doubt on (2), purists must provide specific 
reasons for thinking not just that KU or some other principle that entails (2) is false, 
but that (2) is itself false. As we have already pointed out, however, a successful 
argument against (2) will require explaining why, in the version of Case B that we have been 
considering, you shouldn’t answer ‘yes’ even though you know that answering ‘yes’ will 
have the highest actual utility of your options.  
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Thus, as far as I can tell, even assuming that the various objections to IBAs and 
PBAs in the literature all succeed, the argument in §§1-2 still poses a serious challenge 
for purism. Now of course, if purism is false, then truth-irrelevant factors can affect 
our knowledge. Since the argument in §§1-2 relies on the stipulation that you know 
that hawks are raptors in Case A, perhaps purists will want to say that, because it’s 
wildly implausible that truth-irrelevant factors can affect our knowledge, we should 
insist that you can’t (after all) know that hawks are raptors in Case A. But as Grimm 
(2011) emphasizes, there are ways of characterizing the dependence of knowledge on 
truth-irrelevant factors where the conclusion that truth-irrelevant factors can affect our 
knowledge doesn’t seem at all implausible, much less wildly implausible. And as I argue 
elsewhere (Roeber 2018b), knowledge seems to depend on truth-irrelevant factors even 
if purism is true, so purists can hardly object that impurism makes knowledge depend on 
truth-irrelevant factors. This means that purists can’t resist the stipulation that you 
know that hawks are raptors in Case A by simply pointing out that, if this stipulation 
is permissible, then truth-irrelevant factors can affect our knowledge. 
Now perhaps, at this point, purists will search for a theory of knowledge that entails 
that, while it’s possible to know some things, it’s not possible to know that hawks are 
raptors. If purists could motivate a theory of knowledge like this, they could deduce 
that you don’t know that hawks are raptors even in Case A, and do so without 
trivializing the debate by retreating to full-blown skepticism. But it’s unlikely that 
purists would find what they were looking for. For first, it’s hard to imagine what 
independent motivation they could produce for accepting a theory of knowledge like this. 
And second, even if purists could find some independent motivation for accepting a 
theory like this, it’s hard to see why impurists couldn’t just swap out Case A and Case 
B for a pair of cases built around a proposition that is knowable by the lights of the 
non-skeptical theory that we are imagining purists defending. So it’s doubtful that 
purists could successfully avoid the stipulation that you know that hawks are raptors 
in Case A by retreating to some non-skeptical theory of knowledge that entails that it’s 
impossible to know that hawks are raptors.  
The problem for purists, then, is this. The best strategy for resisting the argument 
in §§1-2 requires rejecting (2), which requires saying that you shouldn’t answer the first 
question ‘yes’ in Case B, even though you know that answering ‘yes’ will maximize 
actual utility in Case B—which seems absurd. In order to dissolve this apparent 
absurdity, purists must explain why (for example) the expected utilities of your options 
must govern your decisions, not just usually or often, but in Case B, even though you 
know that maximizing expected utility would just prevent you from maximizing what 
you know matters more: actual utility. But as the preceding discussion of (2) shows, it’s 
not clear how this explanation would go. So, at the very least, the argument in §§1-2 
saddles purists with a significant explanatory burden. And since impurists can simply 
deny both that you know that hawks are raptors in Case B and that you know that 
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answering ‘yes’ will have the highest actual utility of your options in Case B, purists 
have a significant explanatory burden that impurists lack. So even if purists have given 
adequate responses to all of the PBAs and IBAs in the literature—as I think they 
have—purists haven’t given any adequate response to the best objection to their view.15  
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